The Philippine government chose to address our sovereignty issue against China in the Spratly Islands by involving the US. Some political pundits call it “the old-fashioned strategic balancing of a regional state with outsiders (like the US) to maintain the status quo for the foreseeable future” in the region.
There are a few downsides to this decision. For one, it directly contradicts the public stance of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), firmly opposing “attempts to internationalize the South China Sea issue,” which it claims “should only be resolved bilaterally.”
The PRC also clarified that “outside” involvement, like the participation of the US, India, Japan, and Australia, would turn the case into an “international or multilateral issue that would only make matters worse.”
But why should we kowtow to China? To be clear, I don’t think it is kowtowing but rather acknowledging (or giving the perception of listening) to a neighbor’s concern, a behemoth (both in military might, power, influence, and wealth) of a neighbor at that! But it was an option the Philippine government added to its arsenal to strengthen our sovereignty claims in the disputed territory. Please excuse the thought bubble of the irony of using outside or foreign help to resolve an issue of sovereignty. The fact remains that we did ask for assistance.
Survival Training (JEST) during the Kamandag 07-23 bilateral exercise in Palawan. JEST,
a specialized training program, equips participants with the necessary skills to navigate
and survive in challenging jungle environments and proves especially valuable for military
personnel operating in diverse and demanding operational scenarios, specifically in the
forests of Palawan. (Philippine Marine Corps FB)
According to the Philippine Government, China’s “assertiveness” regarding its claim on the Spratly Islands has raised tensions in the region. US military assistance can shore up the country’s defense capabilities, deter potential aggression in the disputed territory, boost technology exchange, and enhance military training for Filipino soldiers.
There is also the matter of International Legal and Diplomatic support that the US (as our ally) can provide, especially when the Philippines presents its case at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLS), an independent judicial body established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982.
The Philippines has applied UNCLOS rules regarding maritime zones based on its distance from mainland coasts and recognized islands. The Philippines refers to these zones as Exclusive Economic Zones (EZZ) – the “waters beyond and adjacent to its territorial sea and up to the extent of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.”
In 2011, the Philippines suggested the country and the PRC undergo arbitration from the ITLS. Still, China refused, emphasizing that the ITLS “cannot intervene in the South China Sea disputes between China and some Southeast Asian countries.”
As Ralf Emmers pointed out in his paper “The Prospects for Conflict Management and Resolution in the South China Sea” in the Harvard Asia Quarterly, “UNCLOS in itself cannot be applied to solve existing territorial disputes because it leaves overlapping claims unresolved and has no binding enforcement features. It also does not resolve sovereignty disputes.”
Reports noted, other UN agencies like the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has failed to adjudicate over the issue of disputed territory in the Spratlys, specifically those involving China.
It has also been observed that although the UN Security Council has the power to “adopt threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggressions” it has remained uninvolved with regard to the South China Sea issue because the PRC has used its veto power to prevent the UN Security Council’s from getting involved.
On top of all that, in 2006, the PRC made a statutory declaration to the UN that “it will not accept any international court or arbitration in disputes over sea delimitation, territorial disputes, and military activities.” So, any attempt made, whether diplomatic, environmental, or geo-political means, has been stonewalled by China with its unwavering stand.
In his study “Conflict Irresolution in the South China Sea,” David Scott lists several options for claimant countries but admits they have their share of “questions regarding control and relative share of claimants.”
He added that this would also entail the cooperation of all claimants.
Claimants involved in portions, if not in its entirety, of the Spratly Islands include PRC, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Brunei, and Malaysia.
As stated in my previous article titled “What’s at Play from the Old Marcos Playbook,” the territorial dispute centers on 50 small islands and reefs known as the Kalayaan group of islands in the Spratlys in the South China Sea.
According to documents, China laid claims over the Spratly Islands based on maps drawn during the Han Dynasty (206 BC to 220 AD) and found archaeological artifacts indicating that Chinese fishermen used the islands in the past.
For the Philippines, it’s a matter of legal ownership on two fronts. First, after the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, a Filipino named Tomas Cloma laid legal claim to the Kalayaan group of islands. In 1956, Cloma used the argument of “Res Nullius” or “belonging to no one” to claim the Spratlys since no one had previously appropriated the island chain or legally acquired Kalayaan. In 1974, Clomo transferred sovereignty of the islands to the Philippine government. In 1978, the Kalayaan was declared Philippine territory and municipality of the province of Palawan by President Ferdinand E. Marcos (PFEM) when he signed Presidential Decree 1596 into law.
Second, based on PD 1596, Philippine ownership of Kalayaan is “by reason of proximity.” We are the closest country to the Kalayaan islands, which are only about 500 Kilometers from Palawan, the approximate distance between Manila and Ilocos Norte.
Going back to Scott’s options to resolve the issue of sovereignty in the disputed territory, these are:
Dividing Sovereignty
Joint Sovereignty
Pooling sovereignty into a form of higher Joint Authority
Third Party adjudication
ICJ adjudication
Fidel Ramos’ stewardship concept
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)
Demilitarization
Joint Cooperation-Development
President Fidel Ramos’ (PFDR) Stewardship Concept advocated cooperative diplomacy, regional cooperation, a code of conduct, multilateral negotiations vs. bilateral approaches, and economic and environmental cooperation.
To some extent, PFDR’s Stewardship Concept saw progress in diplomatic engagement among claimant countries. Although a comprehensive and legally binding Code of Conduct in the South China Seas has yet to be finalized, communication channels were established to discuss this matter.
Unfortunately, continued PRC presence, the building of permanent structures in disputed territories, and encounters between PRC coast guard and Philippine supply ships and fishermen of late did not bode well for CBMs between the two countries.
Regarding Joint-Cooperating-Development, attempts were made in the early 2000s to conduct joint oil explorations, first with China and then with Vietnam. Still, that tripartite agreement fell through when the Philippines did not renew its commitment.
President Rodrigo Duterte’s administration shut down attempts to resume discussions, citing “constitutional restraints and sovereignty issues.” Just last year, however, reports surfaced of the PBBM administration resuming oil exploration talks. The PBBM administration admitted to setting the parameters that would guide any future oil and gas talks.
It must be noted that the PRC has clearly stated that the South China Sea is a “core interest.” Political observers have stated China has never backed down when it comes to its “core interests.” The waters that are “of core interests” are the very ones the Philippines (at present) has “freedom to navigate” in. It also serves as a lifeline for our import-dependent country. Let us not forget that to feed the people of the Philippines, we need to import. Losing the freedom to navigate the South China Sea is a threat to the very survival of our people.
Of late, with mainstream media’s coverage of RP-US military interaction and joint military exercises in the country, coupled with social media and some of its netizens’ alarm over the size, presence, and movements of US military personnel in the country on top of the PRC’s opposition to US military presence in the Philippines, I couldn’t help reading up on the matter of the disputed Spratly Islands and the strategic importance of the South China Sea.
The Philippines was not the only country or claimant with foreign military alliances or “outsiders.” Vietnam has forged an alliance with India and the US; Malaysia with Australia, Japan, and the US; and Indonesia with the US and Australia.
All claimants are members of the ASEAN. Attempts to get regional bloc support against China’s aggressive pursuit of its sovereignty in the Spratly has made little progress.
Analysts predict that the PRC will soon build a strong enough navy to dominate the South China Sea and forcibly claim disputed territories and natural resources as its own. What actions can the Philippines take to prepare for this?
The Philippines has always had the option of Diplomatic Engagement, Public Diplomacy, and Advocacy. In a future article, let’s delve into this and meet those leading the charge on the diplomatic front with China.