(Part I)

It has come as a surprise to many that the Anti Political Dynasty Bill has been included in the recent priority bills of the Legislative Executive Development Advisory Council (LEDAC), especially given that the president himself comes from a political dynasty. Since then, multiple versions of the bill have been filed in both chambers of Congress, with senators and at least 24 House members proposing competing drafts that differ on how broadly relatives would be barred from holding or running for office. On the surface, this is a welcome sight, research from Ateneo shows that regions with higher dynastic concentration exhibit higher poverty incidence.

However, many observers (myself included) hold the skeptical view that this pivot is a tactical maneuver to consolidate support. More concerning is the possibility that the government is placing a disproportionate bet on this law as a “reform trophy” to survive its current political crisis, while the traditional opposition appears to be entering a Faustian bargain: bargaining for the administration’s survival and legitimacy at the expense of more fundamental economic and institutional reforms. Beyond the optics, an even more fundamental question arises: what would a political dynasty ban actually achieve? To answer this, we must understand the logic of why dynasties exist.

Political dynasties are a common occurrence in countries with weak institutions, particularly weak political party systems with no grounding in ideology and programs. In an ideal democratic setting, people are represented by parties with coherent programs and ideologies. The absence of these breeds the natural counterpart of organization: families. Families concentrate ideas, wealth, and interests.

This phenomenon is not unique in the Philippines. In countries with similarly weak or underinstitutionalized party systems, dynastic politics becomes a primary mode of political organization. In Indonesia, for example, the family of former president Suharto continues to wield political and economic influence decades after his rule, while President Joko Widodo’s own son and son-in-law have entered politics. In India, the Nehru-Gandhi family has dominated the Indian National Congress for generations. Same thing in Mexico and Pakistan.

By contrast, in countries with stronger institutions and more programmatic parties, dynasties exist but are less prominent. In the United Kingdom (UK), families such as the Churchills have produced multiple politicians, but their success depends primarily on party endorsement from the Conservative Party rather than family machinery alone. In the United States (US), the Kennedy family and the Bush family operate within highly institutionalized parties (the Democratic Party and Republican Party) that have independent identities, ideological platforms, and organizational continuity beyond any single surname. Furthermore, the reason why China is able to pursue grand, long-horizon public projects is precisely because political authority is centralized within a strong, disciplined party.

In political theory, this is called the logic of collective action, as explained by American economist Mancur Olson. Collective action is difficult to sustain in large groups because individuals have incentives to free ride, or benefit from collective goods without contributing to their provision. As a result, large and diffuse groups, such as citizens or voters, struggle to organize effectively. In contrast, small, concentrated groups with aligned interests, such as families, are better able to coordinate, enforce loyalty, and sustain collective efforts over time. Families solve collective action problems because they possess internal trust (or have low monitoring costs) and shared incentives, which eliminate the free rider problem.

What’s more, because these families dominate the spatial and temporal aspects of their constituencies, it becomes easier for voters to trust them to continue social programs, perform business functions, or distribute ayudas, compared with a fragmented and discontinuous replacement of political actors every six years. For example, a business owner would find it more logical to do business with a mayor who is part of a dynasty, since, after that family member’s term ends, he will be replaced by another family member, which secures continuity of operation. (To be continued)