There is a rising tide of public clamor to end well-entrenched political dynasties that have been spawned by the absence of a specific anti-dynasty law that would put an end to the dominance of a few ruling political families.

Public frustration with the quality of governance has also reignited calls to raise the qualifications for public office. Proposals range from requiring college degrees for legislators and psychological screening for candidates, to imposing stricter bans on political dynasties. These ideas resonate with a citizenry weary of incompetence, corruption, and personality-driven politics.

Yet many reform efforts falter, not because they lack popular appeal, but because they collide with the design of the 1987 Constitution itself.

The Constitution does not impose demanding entry requirements for elective office. For most national posts – including President, Vice President, Senator and Representative – the qualifications are limited to age, citizenship, residency, literacy, and voter registration.

This is not an accident or an omission. It is a deliberate decision by the framers of the post-EDSA Constitution. Having emerged from a period when power was tightly controlled, the framers sought to prevent legal gatekeeping by political or social elites. They opted instead for openness, trusting that the ultimate judgment on competence and integrity would rest with the electorate.

For the first few post-EDSA years, the election of new faces sparked hope, but this eventually morphed into disenchantment with the ever-growing number of “trapos” getting elected to key public positions.

The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the mandate of the Constitution. Jurisprudence is clear that when the Constitution specifies qualifications for an elective office, these are exclusive. Congress may not add to them through legislation.

The 1987 Constitution requires candidates for President, Vice President, Senator and Representative to be natural-born citizens, registered voters, and able to read and write. Those running for President and VP must be at least 40 years old on election day and residents of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding the election.

For Senator the minimum age is 35 years old; for Representative, it is 25 years old. Minimum Philippine residence is only five years and two years, respectively. For the four highest positions, knowing how to read and write is required additionally.

For appointive offices with constitutional qualifications, such as those in the Supreme Court and lower courts, the nominee must be members of the Philippine Bar with specified periods of law practice.

Well-intentioned proposals—such as requiring educational attainment, professional credentials, or moral fitness tests—are therefore constitutionally vulnerable. The courts have repeatedly ruled that integrity, in the case of elective office, is primarily a political question to be settled at the ballot box, not by pre-election legal screening.

This jurisprudence creates a genuine reform dilemma. On one hand, democratic openness protects the right of citizens from all walks of life to seek public office. On the other, it limits the State’s ability to ensure a baseline level of competence or ethical fitness before candidates are elected. The result is a system that is formally inclusive but substantively uneven. It is an environment dominated by the denizens of traditional politics who thrive on vote-buying and manipulation.

The unbridled dominance of political dynasties illustrates the decadence of the political order.

The Constitution explicitly declares that political dynasties shall be prohibited, “as may be defined by law.” Yet no enabling law has been passed in nearly four decades. While political self-interest is an obvious factor, there is also a legal reality. A poorly crafted anti-dynasty law risks being struck down as an unconstitutional addition to the qualifications for public office.

Where reform has found firmer footing is in appointive offices. The Constitution explicitly requires members of the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman to possess competence, integrity, probity, and independence. These are not rhetorical ideals but enforceable standards. Institutions such as the Judicial and Bar Council were created precisely to operationalize merit-based selection. Calls for greater transparency in vetting, stricter integrity checks, and clearer evaluation criteria are therefore constitutionally sound and democratically defensible.

A brief look at ASEAN practices provides a useful perspective. The Philippines is among the most permissive systems in the region when it comes to elective office. Singapore imposes stringent leadership and integrity requirements for its presidency. Indonesia and Thailand rely heavily on statutory disqualifications and moral fitness tests. Other systems filter candidates through strong party control or centralized screening. These models may produce technocratic competence, but often at the cost of electoral openness.

The Philippine system made a conscious trade-off. It chose democratic access over elite filtering, voter judgment over legal exclusion. The problem today is not that the Constitution trusted the people too much, but that supporting institutions—political parties, campaign finance rules, civic education, and accountability mechanisms—have not kept pace with that trust.

If the nation truly wishes to raise the bar for elective office, reform must proceed on two tracks. The first is institutional and political: strengthening political parties, enforcing campaign finance laws, improving voter information, and holding officials accountable for performance. These measures work within the Constitution’s democratic framework and enhance the quality of choice rather than restrict it.

The second track is constitutional. If society now believes that educational, experiential, or ethical thresholds should be mandatory for those seeking office, then this must be confronted openly through constitutional amendment. To pretend that legislation alone can accomplish what the Constitution does not allow is to invite legal defeat and public cynicism.

In the end, the debate over qualifications is about where our democracy places its faith. The 1987 Constitution reposed that faith in the Filipino voter. Reform today must either strengthen that faith through institutions and education—or revise it through constitutional change.

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