The Sandiganbayan has affirmed the dismissal of the civil forfeiture case filed against the late Leyte governor Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and his widow, Juliette Gomez Romualdez, for violation of their right to speedy disposition of cases.

In a resolution issued last Sept. 2, the anti-graft court denied the motion for partial reconsideration filed by government prosecutors on the court’s June 26, 2025 ruling.

The prosecutors claimed there was no vexatious, capricious, or oppressive delay in the disposition of Civil Case No. 0035 against the Romualdezes and others.

In denying the motion, the Sandiganbayan said: "The Court stands pat on its resolution. No reversible error warrants either its modification or reversal."

It stressed that the prosecution cannot "deftly wash its hands of the inordinate delay" for nearly four decades.

It pointed out: “All told, this Court has taken a second, hard look at the points raised in Plaintiff's Motion. No compelling reason prompts the Court to modify, much less reverse, its well-studied verdict. Suffice it to say that its arguments are nothing but rechauffe."

The nine-page resolution was written by Associate Justice Kevin Narce B. Vivero with the concurrence of Associate Justices Lord A. Villanueva, Arthur O. Malabaguio, and Juliet M. Manalo-San Gaspar.

Civil Case No. 0035, which was filed against Trans Middle East Phils. Equities, Inc. (TMEPEI) owner Romualdez and many others, involved the alleged irregular acquisition of 6,299,177 million shares of stocks of the Philippine Commercial and International Bank (PCIBank).

The prosecution alleged that the late Romualdez used his connection as the brother of former First Lady Imelda Marcos to acquire the shares of stocks and he used TMEPEI and Edilberto Narciso Jr. as “dummy buyers.”

The anti-graft court dismissed the case in a resolution dated June 26 as it found that its continued pendency is "beyond cavil."

It ruled: “Considering the vast duration required just to reach this preliminary phase, it is reasonable to think that the case’s final resolution would further consume a prodigious interval. All told, the Court finds the period in question to be vexatious, capricious, or oppressive to defendants as would warrant the dismissal of the case on the ground of inordinate delay.”