KAOHSIUNG, Taiwan – The 250-kilometer-long Luzon Strait separates the Philippines and Taiwan, connecting the South China Sea with the Pacific Ocean. An important passageway for submarine telecommunications cables and ships traveling between East Asia and North America, it contains several islands that are part of the Batanes and Cagayan provinces. Across the strait, the southern Taiwanese metropolis of Kaohsiung is less than an hour away from Laoag International Airport in Ilocos Norte.

In June 1975, diplomatic relations between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China in Taiwan were severed after then-President Ferdinand Marcos Sr. adopted the One China policy and officially recognized the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Chinese government.

Despite this, trade ties are maintained through unofficial channels: the Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) in the Philippines. MECO has representative offices in Taipei and Kaohsiung, while TECO’s headquarters is located in Makati City’s RCBC Plaza.

Compared to the bustle of Taipei, Kaohsiung is slower-paced and has a more tropical vibe. Its well-known attractions include the Love River waterfront area, with its cafés and cultural spots; the Pier-2 Art Center, a former warehouse district converted into a creative hub; and the 85 Sky Tower, which was once Taiwan’s tallest building and offers panoramic views of the city and the Port of Kaohsiung—Taiwan’s largest seaport and one of the world’s busiest container ports.

Boosting economic links between Kaohsiung and Ilocos Norte is a matter of both geography and policy. They have complementary strengths that could lead to a dynamic trade partnership if properly harnessed. As a powerhouse of maritime commerce, Kaohsiung has a well-developed manufacturing base and an advanced logistics network with the capacity and expertise to facilitate trade flows. Ilocos Norte, on the other hand, has abundant coastal resources, fertile agricultural land, and a growing tourism sector.

Both sides can leverage existing institutional mechanisms provided by MECO and TECO to organize business-matching missions. Such activities should involve the Kaohsiung Chamber of Industry and the Ilocos Norte Chamber of Commerce. Investment promotion should also be a priority. For instance, Ilocos Norte could offer agro-industrial zones with incentives for Taiwanese investors, while Kaohsiung could conduct training programs in food safety and aquaculture technology for Ilocano workers and entrepreneurs.

A precedent for this has been set by China’s Fujian province and several Taiwanese west coast cities through their annual cross-strait trade fairs in Xiamen and Fuzhou, which attract thousands of business delegates. Cross-strait industrial cooperation zones have been established in Fujian, offering preferential tariffs and simplified customs to Taiwanese investors.

Fujian-Taiwan trade is thriving not only because of geographical proximity but also due to dedicated links and special policy zones that were initiated over the past decade. In 2023, Fujian’s bilateral trade with Taiwan reached $14 billion—nearly double the figure for Philippines-Taiwan trade during the same period.

If MECO and TECO can emulate Fujian’s institutional approach while tailoring it to Filipino and Taiwanese conditions, two-way trade could easily double in a decade despite geopolitical issues in the West Philippine Sea. Beyond serving as de facto embassies, they could adopt the roles of cultural envoys and trade accelerators.

Consequently, they should move beyond symbolic ties and deliver tangible increases in bilateral trade, investments, and tourism. With their existing networks, all that MECO and TECO need is a targeted and sustained program, ideally backed by the economic planning agencies of both governments.