SC affirms dismissal of gov't worker convicted of bigamy, an offense involving moral turpitude

The Supreme Court (SC) has affirmed a Court of Appeals (CA) decision which upheld the ruling of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) that dismissed a government employee who was convicted of bigamy, an offense involving moral turpitude.
In some court decisions, an offense involving moral turpitude “is a wicked, deviant behavior constituting an immoral, unethical, or unjust departure from ordinary social standards such that it would shock a community.”
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary says that moral turpitude “includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."
In a decision written by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the SC said:
“The administrative offense of Conviction of a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude is a grave offense, punishable by dismissal from service.
“Bigamy cannot be taken lightly as its commission reflects the person's character. It involves moral turpitude as settled in jurisprudence.
“Petitioner (Petra, not her real name) flagrantly disregarded the law in marrying (Pedro, also not his real name) despite her knowledge of his prior and existing marriage.
“As the appellate court (CA) aptly observed, this ‘shows her moral depravity and cast serious doubt on her fitness and integrity to continue in the public service.’
"This is not reflective of what a public servant should be. It is expected that a public servant shall at all times exhibit the highest sense of discipline and integrity not only in the performance of duties, but also in the personal and private dealings with people.”
Case records showed that Juliana (Pedro’s first wife) filed a complaint for bigamy in 2002 against her husband for marrying Petra in 1997 despite the existence of the couple’s marriage.
Both Pedro and Petra pleaded guilty when arraigned and their conviction for bigamy became final and executory on Oct. 8, 2002.
But Petra told the court that she was forced to marry Pedro because she was pregnant with his child and she did not know of Pedro’s marriage to Juliana.
She said that in 1999, the trial court rendered her marriage to Pedro null and void. Pedro, on the other hand, filed a petition for nullity of his marriage with Juliana. His petition was granted by the court in 2004.
Also in 2004, Petra and Pedro remarried in Japan.
The CSC in the National Capital Region (CSC-NCR) charged Petra administratively for her conviction of bigamy and ordered her dismissal from government service in 2014. In 2015, the CSC’s main office affirmed the ruling of CSC-NCR.
Petra elevated the issued before the CA, which, in 2017, affirmed the CSC’s ruling. The CA did not consider her plea for a lower penalty considering her length of service, the offense was her first, and her exemplary performance as a government employee.
Undaunted, Petra filed a petition with the SC challenging the CA’s ruling.
In dismissing her petition, the SC also said:
“The Petition is not meritorious. The Court affirms the CA ruling -- the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service is proper.
“At the outset, the Court notes that petitioner (Petra) does not contest that: she is guilty of the administrative offense of Conviction of a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude; and that the crime of Bigamy, which she was convicted of in a criminal case before the trial court, is a crime involving moral turpitude.
“What she assails is the CSC's imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service upon the finding of her administrative guilt.
“Considering that the administrative case against petitioner was initiated on July 1, 2003, the applicable rules would be CSC Resolution No. 991936, or the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service46 (URACCS), which was enacted in 1999.
“The URACCS provide that the administrative offense of Conviction of a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude is a grave offense that is punishable with dismissal from service upon first commission. The Rules further provide that aggravating, mitigating, arid alternative circumstances attendant to the offense may be appreciated in determining the penalties to be imposed.
“Thus, the Court agrees with petitioner that mitigating circumstances may be appreciated in her case. The question now is whether those mitigating circumstances she invokes (i.e., length of service, first commission, and outstanding performance) can rightly be applied. The Court rules in the negative.
“The CA is correct in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances petitioner invokes. The facts of the instant case do not justify the mitigation of the prescribed penalty. Case law provides that length of service is an alternative circumstance that can either be mitigating or aggravating, depending on the facts of the case.
“It is not a ‘magic word’ that will automatically be considered as mitigating when invoked. It also cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance when the offense committed is found to be serious.
“Considering the foregoing, the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service upon petitioner is proper. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The August 10, 2017 Decision and the May 9, 2018 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142681 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.”