Finding Answers Former Senator
Atty. Joey Lina It was swift and stunning, yet not quite surprising. But the quick takeover of Taliban forces in Afghanistan still came as a shock to many who had believed the eventual fall of Kabul would take months, instead of mere hours after it was reported the insurgents have surrounded the capital city. The breaking news yesterday that the Taliban took control of the presidential palace in Kabul after Afghan President Ashraf Ghani fled his country bared the naked truth: After two decades, America has lost its longest war. The images of defeat were etched on news footages of the crowded airport filled with people in fear of the Taliban, and a Chinook helicopter flying near the US Embassy in Kabul and believed to be carrying US personnel in the midst of a rushed evacuation, all reminiscent of Saigon in 1975 when US forces lost in the Vietnam War. The rapid deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan has also prompted evacuation efforts for overseas Filipino workers. “There are now planned repatriation flights: the first on August 22, then August 23 and August 24,” according to the Samahang Pilipino sa Afghanistan president Joseph Gumpal. Around 2,000 Filipinos used to be deployed in US and NATO military and telecommunications facilities at the start of this year but many gradually left after the US decision to withdraw its forces in Afghanistan. At least 171 registered OFWs employed by defense contractors reportedly remain in the country and are now the focus of evacuation efforts. The resurgence of the Taliban was unstoppable. In spite of using the most sophisticated weaponry and lethal air power, spending some $2 trillion, commanding at its peak around 130,000 coalition troops, and establishing the 300,000-strong Afghan Security Forces, the US failed to beat the poorly-equipped Taliban forces whose numbers are estimated to be merely around 75,000. Many security analysts and scholars have offered explanations on why the US failed to achieve ultimate victory in Afghanistan after 20 long years. Foremost among the reasons is the resolute willingness of Taliban fighters to die for their beliefs, amid the lack of will among the Afghan national security forces to fight to the death. Such lack of will was evident when many areas of the country fell to the Taliban in quick succession without any firefight. The Afghan army and police forces surrendered or melted away at the sight of Taliban forces closing in. To put it simply, the insurgents expected to die in battle while the numerically superior Afghan forces expected to return home and be with their families. "Afghan forces, for a long period of time, have had problems with morale and also their willingness to fight the Taliban," according to Carter Malkasian, a military adviser who authored "The American War in Afghanistan: A History.” The willingness of the Taliban to fight and die was fueled by religious devotion and a sense of nationalism, analyst say, while the Afghan forces fought, if ever, for the money. But despite all the trillions of US dollars all around, morale was low among government forces because of endemic corruption which led to the soldiers “not getting the supplies and backup they need from their leaders.” The sense of nationalism can indeed drive the intensity to fight and die. "The Taliban can paint themselves as those who are resisting and fighting occupation, which is something that is kind of near and dear to what it means to be Afghan. Whereas that's a much harder thing for the government to claim, or the military forces fighting for the government," Malkasian said. So many lessons can be learned from the US debacle in Afghanistan. One important lesson is that foreign powers, despite the best of intentions, cannot really be expected to ultimately solve internal problems and conflicts. In the case of Afghanistan, it is the Afghan people themselves who ought to work out their problems and find answers. Email: [email protected]