Women’s human rights must be fulfilled, protected and respected.

This was stressed by the Supreme Court (SC) in its decision that cited the agreement ratified by 189 countries on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the provisions of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and the law.

The SC said CEDAW “acknowledges the need to guarantee the basic human rights and fundamental freedoms of women through the adoption in the political, social, economic, and cultural fields, of appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure their full development and advancement.”

“Consistent thereto, no less than the fundamental law of the land (under Article XIII, Section 14) imposes on the State the duty to protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions, as well as facilities and opportunities to enhance their welfare, and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation,” it said.

CEDAW was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1979. In 1981, it was ratified by the Philippines, the first member of the Southeast Asian Nations to do so.

The SC decision, posted last July 30 and written by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez, dismissed the petition filed by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which challenged the ruling handed down by the Court of Appeals (CA) in 2016.

The CA ruling affirmed the decision issued in 2012 by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) in favor of lawyer Daisy B. Panga Vega, then HRET secretary.

The CSC ruled that in applying the rules on maternity leave, Vega was “entitled to both the commuted money value of the unexpired portion of the special leave and her salary for actual services rendered effective the day she reported back for work.”

Case records showed that on Feb. 3, 2011, HRET approve Vega’s request for special leave for a period not exceeding two months starting Feb.7, 2011. On Feb. 7, 2011, she underwent total hysterectomy, an operation to remove the uterus.

On March 7, 2011, after a month of availing herself of the special leave, Vega informed the HRET that she was reassuming her duties and functions. She presented a medical certificate dated March 5, 2011, stating that there was "no contraindication to resume light to moderate activities."

On March 9, 2011, she presented another medical certificate stating that she was already "fit to work" after her physical examination on March 6, 2011.

On March 10, 2011, the HRET directed Vega to consume her two-month special leave. Her motion to reconsider HRET’s directive was denied. She appealed to the CSC.

The CSC’s ruling in her favor was affirmed by the CA which dismissed HRET’s petition.

Adopting the CSC's findings, the CA ruled that Vega may opt not to consume the full leave she applied for upon her submission of the medical certificate, as it held that nothing in Republic Act No. 9710 (Magna Carta of Women) precludes the suppletory application of the rules on maternity leave to the special leave benefit under RA 9710.

When HRET’s motion to reconsider the CA’s ruling was denied, the electoral tribunal elevated the case to the SC.

The SC said that HRET’s petition could be dismissed outright because it (petition) should have been filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which is the government’s lawyer in all cases.

“Even on the merits, however, the petition must still fail,” the SC said.

It pointed out that Section 18 of RA No. 9710 entitles “a woman, who has rendered a continuous aggregate employment service of at least six months for the last 12 months, a special leave of two months with full pay based on her gross monthly compensation following surgery caused by gynecological disorders.”

“In relation to this provision, the case involving Vega gives rise to the issue of whether the rules on maternity leave under Sec. 14, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, which provides that the commuted money value of the unexpired portion of the special leave need not be refunded, and that when the employee returns to work before the expiration of her special leave, she may receive both the benefits granted under the maternity leave law and the salary for actual services rendered effective the day she reports for work, may have a suppletory application,” it said.

It then cited CEDAW and the 1987 Philippine Constitution which prompted the enactment of RA 9710.

The SC said that RA 9710 “guarantees the availability of opportunities, services, and mechanisms that will allow them (women) to actively perform their roles in the family, community, and society.”

“As a social legislation, its paramount consideration is the empowerment of women. Thus, in case of doubt, its provisions must be liberally construed in favor of women as the beneficiaries,” it stressed.

The SC also said:

“The Court finds it just and more in accord with the spirit and intent of RA No. 9710 to suppletorily apply the rule on maternity leave to the special leave benefit.

“Similar to the special leave benefit under RA No. 9710, a maternity leave under the Omnibus Rules on Leave seeks to protect the health and welfare of women, specifically of working mothers, as its primary purpose is to afford them some measures of financial aid, and to grant them a period of rest and recuperation in connection with their pregnancies.

“The special leave benefit should be liberally interpreted to support the female employee so as to give her further means to afford her needs, may it be gynecological, physical, or psychological, for a holistic recuperation. The recovery period may be a trying time that she needs much assistance and compassion to regain her overall wellness.

“Nothing in RA No. 9710 and the CSC Guidelines bar this more humane interpretation of the provision on special leave benefit.

“Anent Vega's return to work, while RA No. 9710 and the CSC Guidelines do not require that the entire special leave applied for be consumed, certain conditions must be satisfied for its propriety. Under the CSC Guidelines, a total hysterectomy is classified as a major surgical procedure requiring a minimum period of recuperation of three weeks to a maximum period of two months.

“Aside from observing this time frame, the employee, before she can return to work, shall present a medical certificate signed by her attending surgeon that she is physically fit to assume the duties of her position.

“Vega underwent total hysterectomy on Feb.7, 2011, and decided to return to work on March 7, 2011. As it appears, she was already able to observe a period of recuperation of four weeks.

“As to the requirement for a medical certificate, it is inconsequential to belabor the seeming deficiency of the first medical certificate dated March 5, 2011, which merely stated that there was no contraindication for her to resume light to moderate activities, as she already presented a medical certificate dated March 9, 2011 signed by her attending obstetrician/gynecologist attesting her physical fitness to report back for work.

“Based on these facts on record, the CSC found that Vega sufficiently complied with the CSC Guidelines warranting her return to work.

“The Court accords finality to these findings acknowledging the CSC's special knowledge and expertise on matters falling under its jurisdiction as an administrative agency, and given the affirmance by the CA.

“FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 29, 2016 anci Resolution dated Nov. 8, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 128947 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.”