Philippine laws “never required our elective public officials to be immaculately free from a troubled past.”
“As a matter of fact, the mere imposition of an administrative penalty does not automatically disqualify a public officer from running for public office,” the Supreme Court (SC) said.
These SC declarations were contained in a resolution, written by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, which denied the motions to reconsider the court’s ruling that allowed Edgardo A. Tallado to run for Camarines Norte governor, a post he won in the 2019 elections.
On May 9, 2019, Tallado was disqualified by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) and cancelled his certificate of candidacy (COC) to run for governor in the 2019 elections with a ruling that he had served fully his three terms.
But on May 10, 2019, the SC issued an order that effectively stop the Comelec from enforcing its decision. Tallado won in the May 13, 2019 elections. On May 16, 2019, he was proclaimed as duly elected governor of Camarines Norte.
Finally, on Sept. 10, 2019, the SC granted Tallado’s petition as it nullified the May 9 ruling of the Comelec. Both the Comelec and Norberto B. Villamin and Senandro M. Jalgado who sought Tallado’s disqualification filed their motions to reconsider the SC ruling.
Case records showed that Tallado was elected governor in the 2010, 2013 and 2016 elections. He served his full term in 2010 to 2013 and in 2013 to 2016.
It was during his 2016-2019 term when controversies arose that led the Comelec to cancel his COC for the May 13, 2019 elections. The controversies stemmed from the three administrative cases filed against Tallado before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)
On Jan. 28, 2013, an administrative case was filed against Tallado for grave misconduct, oppression or grave abuse of authority. While the case was pending, he won the 2013 elections.
On Oct. 2, 2015, while he was serving his 2013-2016 term, the OMB found him administratively liable and ordered his suspension for one year. The Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) implemented the suspension.
On his appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reduced the suspension to six months. He re-assumed his post as governor.
But on Nov. 4, 2015, another case was filed against Tallado before the OMB. On Sept. 13, 2016, the OMB found him guilty of grave misconduct and oppression/abuse of authority and ordered his dismissal from the service.
On Nov. 8, 2016, the DILG ordered Tallado to vacate his post as governor and directed Vice Governor Jonah Pedro G. Pimentel to assume the post of Camarines Norte governor. Pimentel took his oath as governor on Nov. 16, 2016.
With the CA’s temporary restraining order (TRO) issued on Dec. 12, 2016, Tallado was able to re-assume his post as governor.
His re-assumption spawned the third administrative case for which the OMB, on Jan. 11, 2018, ordered his dismissal from the service.
Based on the OMB’s ruling, the DILG again installed Pimentel as Camarines Norte governor.
When the CA modified the dismissal to just six months suspension on Sept. 26, 2018, Tallado re-assumed his post on Oct. 29, 2018 based on a memorandum issued by the DILG. He took his oath on Oct. 30, 2018 after filing his COC for governor on Oct. 15, 2018 for the May 13, 2019 elections.
In his petition that challenged the Comelec’s disqualification ruling, Tallado told the SC that his third term as governor was involuntarily interrupted when the OMB’s dismissal orders were implemented.
He said his removal from office caused a permanent vacancy that necessitated the appointment of Pimentel as his successor.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its comment, sided with Tallado. It said the implementation of the OMB’s decisions on Tallado’s removal from office must be considered as term interruption because he thereby ceased to exercise the functions and prerogatives of the office; and that he must be deemed not to have fully served his third term as Governor considering that he involuntarily lost his title to the office.
In the Sept. 10, 2019 SC decision, written by then Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, the High Tribunal ruled that “interruption of term entails the involuntary loss of title to office, while interruption of the full continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective position equates to failure to render service.”
The SC said:
“The DILG's execution of the OMB decisions for the petitioner's (Tallado’s) dismissal clearly constituted loss of the petitioner's title to the office. The dismissals were involuntary interruptions in the petitioner's 2016-2019 term. As such, he cannot be considered to have fully served a third successive term of office.
“In fine, the petitioner was not disqualified from seeking the same elective post during the 2019 elections. The Comelec thus gravely abused its discretion in ordering the cancellation of the petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy for the 2019 elections.”
In seeking to reconsider the 2019 decisions, the Comelec, Villamin and Jalgado alleged that the SC committed an error in ruling that Tallado’s removal from office constitutes a valid interruption of his term.
They also alleged that for the SC to allow such construction “would reward corrupt and unscrupulous politicians to escape the grasp of the three-term prohibition.”
In resolving the motion, the SC spelled out the difference in OMB’s dismissal orders of an appointive official to that of an elective official’s removal from service.
The SC said:
“Thus, when an appointive official is initially dismissed by the 0MB and his penalty eventually judicially modified and reduced, the rules of the 0MB declare his period of dismissal, by fiction of law, as a period of preventive suspension with payment of backwages and other emoluments.
“This means that for the appointive official, it is as if he was never removed and all the vestiges of his removal were reversed. There is nothing wrong with this conversion because his removal only affected his wages which are eventually given to him.
“But this is not the same for elective local government officials, like petitioner, because dismissal of an elective local government official does not only affect receipt of salaries but also affects his term, which would effectively be interrupted -- an interruption which has constitutional consequences.
“When an elective local public officer is administratively dismissed by the 0MB and his penalty subsequently modified to another penalty, like herein petitioner, the period of dismissal cannot just be nonchalantly dismissed as a period for preventive suspension considering that, in fact, his term is effectively interrupted.
“During said period, petitioner cannot claim to be Governor as his title is stripped of him by the 0MB despite the pendency of his appeal. Neither does he exercise the power of the office. Said title and power are already passed to the Vice-Governor. He also cannot claim that the exercise of his power is merely suspended since it is not.
“Hence, the Court cannot tum a blind eye on the interruption of his term despite the ex post facto redemption of his title following the 0MB rule. Considering the constitutional consequences of the application of 0MB Rules to local elective officials compared to other officials under the administrative jurisdiction of the 0MB, there is reason to excuse the former from the preventive suspension rule.
“The exception cannot be said to be in violation of the equal protection clause. In the past, the Court has recognized the substantial distinction of elective officials as compared to appointive officials. The application of the ‘preventive suspension proviso’ to appointive officials does not affect a constitutional provision while the application of the same rule to elective officials, particularly, local elective officials, has constitutional consequences.
“Respondents fear that the Court's construction would reward corrupt politicians who will perpetuate their term by escaping the constitutional term limits. This claim is not only unfair but also discriminatory.
“To begin with, the Court's conclusion is but an application of established jurisprudential concepts and was never intended to reward corrupt politicians who escape dismissal. The 0MB 's dismissal order is immediately executory and, once executed, the public officer ceases to have title for the time being.
“Hence, it should be considered as an interruption of his term. The fact that the public official is not an ideal one, considering his administrative baggage, does not deprive him of the law's application.
“Lastly, the Court's construction cannot be construed as a reward for corrupt politicians as it does not guarantee their prolonged grips on power. It must be remembered that they are still subject to competitive and recurring democratic elections wherein the people decide their political fate.
“It is presumptuous to say that upon the Court's decision, public officials would automatically claim their stakes in certain government positions for the foreseeable future. With or without the application of the three-term limit rule, their political futures are still uncertain. Thus, respondents' fears are clearly unfounded.
“WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsiderations are hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.”