Richard Javad Heydarian By Richard Javad Heydarian (Part III)   Partisans of Charter change are often quick to highlight that federal and parliamentary nations are among the most successful in the world. They love to cite the likes of Britain and Germany, which either have parliaments or a federal form of government, or both. They are also quick to underline the weaknesses of unitary and presidential forms of government, with America, Africa, and much of Latin America in mind. In their view, by adopting the form of government in prosperous democracies, we will, somehow, move along their historical trajectory. The pro-Charter change camp is fond of underscoring the importance of a federal-parliamentary form of government to economic dynamism. The question, however, is: Does the form of government really explain, say, economic success? Or is it something else that explains the economic success of a diverse set of nations, some democratic, some autocratic, with very divergent forms of government. We shall discuss issues of decentralization, autonomy, and democratic vitality in succeeding essays, where I will go into the prospects and challenges of federal-parliamentary rule in the Philippines. Let’s start with Confucian Asia, which is composed of communist regimes of China and Vietnam as well as autocratic-turned-liberal democracies of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Singapore is a special case, since it’s (just similar to Hong Kong) a city-state sans the complex rural-urban dynamics of development. In the case of China, we can clearly see how the country — in spite of its Confucian values — has come to not only match the industrial might of the West, but also gradually transform into the world’s leading economy. Before China, the likes of Japan (after the Meiji Restoration) and Newly-Industrializing Countries (NICs) of South Korea and Taiwan, during Post-World War II period, were able to emerge as global economic players, crucially without adopting Western religious values, but instead looking into certain elements within their own (Asian-Sinic) culture, which encouraged entrepreneurial spirit, adoption of Western technological infrastructure, and capitalist development. So obviously, culture, as Weber tried to argue, doesn’t explain their economic conditions. All these Asian tigers were able to transform from feudal, agricultural societies into hubs of innovation and production in the past century. But Asian economic miracles were not limited to Northeast Asia, where North Korea continues to be among the most repressive and backward societies (with a mighty military though), since many Southeast Asian countries, notably Malaysia and Thailand, were also able to climb up in the global chains of production, and lift millions of people out of poverty. More recently, Muslim-majority and ethnically diverse Indonesia has joined the ranks of tiger (cubs). Even the Philippines has begun to score impressive growth rates in recent years, even if our culture hasn’t dramatically changed, as far as I know. What changed, obviously, were our policies, namely the macroeconomic reforms that began under the Arroyo and Aquino administrations, and are continued under the current administration. At this point, one naturally tends to ask: if not culture, then what? Obviously, the article doesn’t intend to provide a definitive response to this question. That would be unrealistic. Yet, the first step to a correct investigation into the roots of the Philippines’ developmental debacle — or glaring socio-economic troubles — is to (a) ask the right questions and (b) identify more convincing ‘independent variables’ (or principle cause/s) for the awry state of affairs in the country in the past decades. If there is one thing that the experience of NICs — and their Japanese and European inspiration — tells us is this: Culture is malleable, subject to re-configuration and improvement (depending on your interest and goals). And this brings us to the topic of state-building and bureaucratic empowerment as the magic formula to national transformation and success. The modern state, ranging from those in the capitalist societies, to more ominous ones among dystopian “totalitarian” states, has the “integrative mechanisms” to shape and re-shape society for the fulfillment of systemic objectives. After all, most “developed” Asian societies used to be paragons of complacency, stagnation, and feudal destitution before they — or more precisely their states — shook off bad habits, and adopted as well as adapted “best practices” from the industrial West and Japan. Following this analysis, one discovers that the Philippines’ developmental troubles have a lot to do with “state-formation” — or lack of a strong, independent state — in the country. This is precisely what differentiates the Philippines from many of its successful neighbors, which have had strong and enlightened executives, autonomously undertaking crucial (and correct) economic decision without pandering to specific interest groups. As Filipino scholars, notably Joel Migdal, have correctly analyzed, the main problem with the Philippines is that it never had a “strong” state, which normally has at its disposal an enabling combination of sufficient “policy autonomy” and “functional capacity” to craft and implement right decision in the interest of the country. Instead, the Philippine state is basically an instrument of extra-state, parochial interests, which hardly coincide with the broader national interest. In contrast, the NICs, China and Japan had relatively strong states, which transcended particularistic interests and implemented a long-term national vision of economic development. As a result, initially capital-poor Asian countries were able to transform into major technological hubs — and a global source of capital for consumerist societies. In most cases, we see how a strong, autonomous state changed the national culture, created its own “comparative advantage” within the global economic structures, and sidelined predatory elites for the preservation of national interest. Thus, the question is: Does Charter Change help bring about a strong and autonomous Philippine state, or further weaken an already feeble state?