Manuel (Lolong) M. Lazaro By Manuel (Lolong) M. Lazaro Chairman, Philconsa (Part II) Model of simplicity   The framers could have emulated the fine example of the framers of the 1935 Constitution, a model of simplicity, brevity, and craftsmanship. Or, they could have patterned our Constitution after the bare essentials of the US Constitution. The latter has only seven articles centered on the three major branches of government, i.e., the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. In contrast, our 1987 Constitution has 28 articles including the Transitory Provisions. Instead of concentrating on the three branches of government, it creates or provides for a host of commissions, offices, and other governmental agencies that blur or gain in prominence as the three branches. These include the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, the Commission on Audit (Art. IX), the Office of the Ombudsman (Sec. 5, Art XI), the National Economic and Development Authority (Sec. 9, Art. XII), the Central Bank (Sec. 20, Art. XII), the Commission on Human Rights (Sec. 17, Art. XIII), and the Judicial and Bar Council (Sec. 8 , Art. VIII). A reexamination of this method of constitutionalizing these governmental offices, which are already provided for or could easily be provided for by statute, becomes timely and appropriate. Almost all of the provisions in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies in our 1987 Constitution fall within the orbit of “general welfare” or, as the framers termed it in the other provisions, “common good.” The framers need not spell out all the things that the government must do or not do. Generalities could have allowed greater room for flexibility and inspired creative statesmanship. Besides, no government has any business governing if it does not know its priorities and the needs of the people. A Constitution must provide only for broad policies and the general framework of government, without detailing every priority and the agenda of government. The lengthy and verbose 1987 Constitution illustrates the paramount importance of when “less is more.” In the matters where the framers could have easily been right, they were wrong, and in the things they could have easily been correct, they were in error simply because they were in error simply because they were in error simply because they were obdurate by the shadows of the Marcoses and the fresh wounds suffered. Much of the anxieties or dubieties are due to the blending, or unblending inclusion of conflicting shibboleths. Symbols and politics have been intertwined in the conceptual apparatus. Semantical distinctions confound and confuse, rather than clarify the language. Art. XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights appears to be a statutory expansion of the policies on social justice, “just and dynamic social order,” protection to labor, agrarian land reform, urban land reform, health, women, and human dignity. Since the policies were already set forth in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution need not detail them since they could be taken up in statutes to be enacted by the Congress. This exemplifies once more the propensity to elaborate and complicate what should have been a simple pronouncement of policies. The provisions on Human Rights (especially Sections 17, 18, and 19, Article XIII) are motivated and induced by the experiences of some of the framers and the fears they entertained during the Marcos regime. The same may be said with the too elaborate articles on the national economy and patrimony, education, and general provisions (Arts. XII, XIV, and XVI). Perhaps, it is the only Constitution that provides for consumerism, the mass media and advertising which are already taken up in existing statutes. Circumlocutory The Constitution is best described as “circumlocutory” or “pleonastic.” Some provisions are “circumbendibus.” This is aggravated by the use of technical or ambiguous words pliable or dimensional in meanings and without accepted legal connotations. To cite a few, the words “love” (Preamble), “nationalism,” “nationalist perspective,” and “patriotic spirit” (Art. II, Sec. 17); Art XVI Sec. 5 ) and “vital industry” are un-legal abstractions. In the “New Dictionary of Thoughts,” love is defined 183 different ways (pp. 368-376). It also means “never having to say I’m sorry” as in the romantic novel and film Love Story. Its incorporation into the Constitution underscores the emotional overtones. Can love be constitutionalized? It is like asking, can hate and violence be eradicated? These belong to the realm of emotions which are beyond the regulatory orbit of the law. The abstruse or technical words inserted in some provisions of the Constitution were what Stuart Chase described as the “weasel words in the jargon of lawyers.” As Chase lamented, “there is no certainty, no surety, no omniscience in the language.” The imperfections of our 1987 Constitution have not escaped the attention of the Supreme Court. Justice Cruz, in his dissenting opinion in Sarmiento III vs. Mison, 156 SCRA 570-571, described the fundamental law as a “rather confused Constitution,” an observation to which Justice Sarmiento wholeheartedly agreed per his concurring opinion. In the minds of these justices, the Constitution is not only confused. It is also littered with “idiosyncraries” and “eccentricities.” To mention the example of Justice Sarmiento, under the provisions of Article VII, Section 16 of the Constitution, a consul’s appointment needs confirmation from the Commission of Appointments that of the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, his superior, does not.   (To be continued)