Dismissal of Samuel Jardin in 2020 as LTFRB executive director affirmed by Court of Appeals


Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals (CA) has affirmed the 2020 ruling of the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) which ordered the dismissal of lawyer Samuel Aloysius M. Jardin as executive director of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB).

Jardin was ordered dismissed for grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and violations of the Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RACCS) and Republic Act No. 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

He elevated the OMB’s ruling before the CA which dismissed his petition in a decision promulgated last Sept. 22. The CA decision was written by Associate Justice Rex Bernardo L. Pascual with the concurrence of Associate Justices Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob and Tita Marilyn B. Payoyo-Villordon.

On April 3, 2019, then Secretary Arthur P. Tugade of the Department of Transportation (DoTr) charged Jardin with grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for allegedly soliciting P4.8 million and P4.6 million from individuals for the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and franchise.

Tugade, on the same day the charge was filed, ordered the 90-day preventive suspension of Jardin. Tugade then sent a memorandum to the Office of the President (OP) and recommended that appropriate disciplinary action be instituted against Jardin “for causes arising from his alleged corrupt acts.”

In February 2020, the OP – through the deputy executive secretary for legal affairs – referred Tugade’s memorandum to the OMB for investigation and adjudication.

On March 6, 2020, the OMB informed Jardin of its investigation and directed him to file his counter-affidavit which he did. Thereafter, on OMB’s order, the parties submitted their verified position papers.

On Dec. 22, 2020, the OMB found Jardin guilty as charged and ordered his dismissal as LTFRB executive director. When the OMB denied Jardin’s motion for reconsideration, he elevated the issue before the CA on June 22, 2021.

In his petition, Jardin told the CA that the OMB improperly instituted the administrative proceedings as Tugade for DoTr did not submit a sworn complaint in compliance with the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.

He also said that the OMB erroneously found him guilty of the crimes charged despite the insufficiency and inadmissibility of the evidence presented during the proceedings, and that the OMB committed reversible errors in giving due course to the administrative proceedings despite the existence of forum-shopping.

The DoTr refuted Jardin’s allegations. It told the CA the OMB did not commit errors in the institution of the administrative complaint against Jardin whose dismissal was supported by substantial evidence.

In dismissing Jardin’s petition, the CA ruled:

“The disciplinary authority over presidential appointees, such as the petitioner (Jardin) in this case, belongs concurrently to the Office of the President (OP) and the Office of the Ombudsman.

“Thus, the Office of the Ombudsman has the full administrative disciplinary authority, including the power to determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said penalty.

“In the instant case, the administrative case against the petitioner was properly initiated due to the Referral Letter dated February 26, 2020 issued by the Office of the President, through the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs. Specifically, the Referral Letter referred for investigation and adjudication several administrative complaints against the petitioner for his alleged corrupt acts.

“Contrary to the petitioner's averments therefore, nothing is irregular in the institution of the administrative case against him and the Office of the Ombudsman correctly exercised its jurisdiction to hear the same.

“Finally, the petitioner avers that there was no substantial evidence to support the pronouncement of his administrative liability. We do not agree.

“It must be emphasized that a finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that the public officer charged has committed acts stated in the complaint or formal charge.

“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine differently. The requirement is already satisfied where there is reasonable ground to believe that the person charged is guilty of the act or omission complained of, even if the evidence might not be overwhelming.

“Given these precepts, We find no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the Ombudsman, the same being supported by substantial evidence.

“In the case at bar, the petitioner was charged with grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial before the Office of the Ombudsman which found him guilty as charged, and imposed on him the supreme penalty of dismissal from government service with all its accessory penalties.

“Here, the Office of the Ombudsman correctly found substantial evidence that the petitioner solicited and received P4,600,000 in exchange for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience from the LTFRB, where the petitioner was appointed as Executive Director.

“Considering the credibility and weight of the evidence presented against the petitioner, We find that the offenses charged against him have been substantially proven.

“It is well settled that findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. Their factual findings are generally accorded with great weight and respect, if not finality by the courts, by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction.

“This Court thus recognizes the expertise and independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and will avoid interfering with its findings absent a finding of abuse of discretion or clear misappreciation of facts.

“Accordingly, We see no reason to deviate from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman, its findings and conclusions having been supported by both law and applicable jurisprudence.

“WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review dated June 21, 2021 is DENIED. The Decision and Joint Order dated December 22, 2020 and March 17, 2021, respectively, of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-20-0027 are hereby AFFIRMED.

“Accordingly, since the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction is merely an adjunct to the main suit, the same is likewise DENIED. SO ORDERED.”