To be entitled to government compensation, a person charged with a criminal offense must have been unjustly accused, convicted of the offense charged, imprisoned due to conviction, and subsequently acquitted on appeal.
The conditions for compensation under Republic Act No. 7309, the 1992 law that created the Board of Claims for victims of unjust imprisonment or detention and violent crimes, was clarified by the Supreme Court (SC) in a decision on the appeal filed by a Muslim who was suspected to be a member of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).
In a full court decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC denied the petition of Main T. Mohammad as it affirmed the ruling of the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice (DOJ) that was upheld by the Secretary of Justice in 2021.
In 2017, Mohammad was arrested, detained, and charged in court with piracy and two counts of murder.
In 2019, the charges were dismissed by the regional trial court (RTC) for failure of the prosecution to present a witness who could identify Mohammad as the same person charged in the cases.
Mohammad then filed a compensation claim before the DOJ’s Board of Claims in Zamboanga City. He invoked Section 3(a) of RA 7309 which provides that “any person who was unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal” may file claims for compensation.
According to Mohammad, the conjunction “and” in Section 3(a) should be construed as “or” to avoid injustice to persons unjustly prosecuted even though subsequently acquitted by the trial court.
The Board of Claims, however, denied his claim on the ground that prior conviction in the trial court and subsequent release from detention due to acquittal on appeal are required.
The Justice Secretary affirmed the board’s ruling. Mohammad elevated the issue before the SC.
In denying Mohammad’s petition, the SC ruled:
“The provision is clear. For a successful claim for compensation under Section 3(a) of RA 7309, the following elements must concur: (a) there must be a person who was unjustly accused; (b) the person must have been convicted of the offense; (c) the person was imprisoned by virtue of the conviction; (d) the person was subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal.
“In this case all the elements are absent. Hence, Mohammad’s claim for compensation under RA 7309 was property denied.
“For the first element, the Court finds that the same is lacking as no other reason was given by Mohammad other than that he was detained for two years only to be acquitted by the Regional Trial Court later.
“The Court reiterates that the finding of probable cause by our prosecutors, absent any bad faith, cannot be considered as an unjust accusation, even if the same ultimately leads to an acquittal of the accused.
“Mohammad was acquitted at the first instance by the RTC due to the failure of the prosecution to produce an identifying witness. He was not convicted and subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal. A determination of unjust conviction could not be had if there was no prior conviction to begin with.
“With regard to Mohammad’s continued detention throughout the duration of trial, We find that there is nothing irregular with the same. To recall, Mohammad was detained due to charges of piracy and murder, both non-bailable offenses.
“Hence, his continued detention for the duration of the trial was only proper considering the gravity of the offenses charged.
“It is at this juncture that the Court emphasizes the importance of the element of prior conviction for cases falling under Section 3(a) of RA 7309. A determination of the existence of an unjust accusation, conviction, and imprisonment may only be done when the accused is convicted but is later on acquitted on appeal.
“Even then, however, the fact that the accused’s conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not proof by itself that the previous conviction was ‘unjust,’ since there are several reasons why a conviction may be set aside.”
“Accordingly, the Petition is denied. The Decision dated Feb. 1, 2021 of the Secretary of Justice is affirmed. So ordered.”