The Court of Appeals (CA) has affirmed its July 7, 2022 decision that upheld the conviction of Rappler’s Chief Executive Officer Maria A. Ressa and the news outfit’s former researcher Reynaldo Santos Jr. for cyber libel under the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.
In a resolution promulgated last Oct. 10, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Ressa, a Nobel Peace Prize Laurette, and Santos. The resolution was written by Associate Justice Roberto P. Quiroz with the concurrence of Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato Jr. and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi.
Ressa and Santos had been sentenced to a minimum of six months and one day to a maximum of six years, eight months and 20 days in prison.
Under the rules, they can file a petition with the Supreme Court (SC) to challenge the CA’s decision and resolution.
“A careful and meticulous review of the motion for reconsideration reveals that the matters raised by the accused appellants (Ressa and Santos) had already been exhaustively resolved and discussed in the assailed Decision,” the CA ruled.
The cyber libel complaint was based on a 2012 article written by Santos claiming that businessman Wilfredo Keng – the complainant -- lent his sports utility vehicle to then Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
The same article also cited an intelligence report that Keng had been under surveillance by the National Security Council for alleged involvement in human trafficking and drug smuggling.
Keng filed the complaint in 2017. He was quoted as saying that he was forced to seek legal vindication after his efforts for Rappler to rectify the published article became futile.
In its resolution that denied the motion for reconsideration, the CA said:
“We highlight our previous disquisition that the subject article cannot be deemed as qualifiedly privileged considering that it was not proven to be a fair and true report made in good faith, or a fair commentary on matters of public interest.
“Taking into account that the accused-appellants did not appear in court to testify and prove good faith in publishing the subject article, it also remained undisputed that Wilfredo Keng was never asked of his side of the story regarding the allegations of criminal activities imputed against him prior to the publishing and republishing of the subject article, and that the clarificatory article, which was purportedly already written by a reporter from Rappler, was never published despite several follow-up requests by Wilfredo Keng.
“Likewise, the accused-appellants cannot claim good faith and seek protection from liability by claiming that it was not them who named Wilfredo Keng as the person involved in illegal activities, but rather it was based solely on its sources which included an intelligence report allegedly rendered by the National Security Council and an article published by Philippine Star.
“As it is, good faith is indeed wanting, as the accused-appellants failed to substantiate that they verified their story on Wilfredo Keng before publishing the subject article.
“It cannot be overly emphasized that the qualifiedly privileged communications are those which contain defamatory imputations but which are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or justifiable motive, and to which ‘private communications’ and ‘fair and true report without any comments or remarks" belong.
“Since the qualifiedly privileged communications are the exceptions to the general rule, these require proof of actual malice in order that a defamatory imputation may be held actionable.
“But when malice in fact is proven, as in this case, assertions and proofs that the libelous articles are qualifiedly privileged communications are futile, since being qualifiedly privileged communications merely prevents the presumption of malice from attaching to a defamatory imputation.
“In conclusion, it worthy and relevant to point out that the conviction of the accused-appellants for the crime of cyber libel punishable under the Cybercrime Law is not geared towards the curtailment of the freedom of speech, or to produce an unseemingly chilling effect on the users of cyberspace that would possibly hinder free speech.
“On the contrary, We echo the wisdom of the Supreme Court in the Disini case that the purpose of the law is to safeguard the right of free speech, and to curb, if not totally prevent, the reckless and unlawful use of the computer systems as a means of committing the traditional criminal offenses.
“WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. SO ORDERED.”
TAGS: #CA #RESSA #CYBER LIBEL