Poor coordination between the police and the military, and the slow dissemination of intelligence packets gave the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) the opportunity to attack the town proper of Datu Piang in Maguindanao on the night of Dec. 3.
Maj. Gen. Marni Marcos, Jr., head of the Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management (DIDM), said that prior to the attack, there were already persistent reports that the BIFF would attempt to lay siege on Datu Piang.
Government intelligence units were able to monitor these reports.
But, according to Marcos, there was a lack of appreciation on the monitored intelligence reports about the plan of the BIFF.
“There was a lack of coordination and intelligence validation with the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) counterparts and other stakeholders in the area. There are identified gaps that need further enhancement, the coordination mechanism between the PNP and other security forces at the ground level should be improved on intelligence sharing and movement of troops,” said Marcos, who also heads the Board of Inquiry that looked into the incident.
“There should also be a speedy dissemination of intelligence that requires urgent actions to the end users,” he added.
In highlighting the importance of immediate relay of intelligence reports, Marcos revealed that the chief of police of Datu Piang for instance was only informed about the BIFF plan to attack the town proper a few hours before the incident.
As a result, he said that the local police force was not able to prepare properly that include fortification of defense and call for standby and augmentation forces.
Despite the slow transmission of intelligence reports about the attack, members of the local police force were able to stand their ground and even prevented the burning of the local church.
A police patrol car, however, was burned by the BIIF fighters on their way to escape.
Same old problems
The same findings have been heard over and over again in the past as these are the measures that the leadership of both the PNP and the AFP have repeatedly promised to do, among them were after the death of 44 police commandos in 2015 and the Marawi City siege in 2017.
In 2018, six policemen died while nine others were wounded at the hands of the local military force who mistook them as communist rebels in the jungles of Sta. Rita town of Samar.
The policemen were on a test mission then.
Lack of coordination and improper communication were seen as the reasons behind the mis-encounter.
In 2019, four military intelligence operatives died at the hands of police forces in Sulu.
Military intelligence operatives were then tailing suicide bombers when they were flagged down by the police.
In most of these cases, the causes identified are lack of coordination as well as the slow appreciation and relay of intelligence reports, based on the investigation of the Board of Inquiries or any special investigating team that would be created.
Recommendations
The Marcos-led BOI has already recommended filing of charges against the BIFF attackers reportedly led by Salahuddin Hassan and Animbang Indong.
The BOI has also recommended that the policemen who repelled the attack on the police station and the local church be commended for gallantry.
The chief of police of Datu Piang, Capt. Israel Bayona, who was relieved after the attack has also been recommended for reinstatement.